OFFICE OF THE
INFORMATION & PRIVACY
COMMISSIONER
— for —
British Columbia

Order 02-20

LAW SOCIETY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

David Loukidelis, Information and Privacy Commissioner
May 15, 2002

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Summary: The applicant sought access to the names of all individuals who had, in calendar 2000, made complaints to the Law Society about a lawyer's conduct. The Law Society is not required to disclose this third-party personal information under s. 25(1) and is required to refuse disclosure under s. 22.

Key Words: personal information – unreasonable invasion of personal privacy – investigation into a possible violation of law – public scrutiny – supplied in confidence – public interest – significant harm – public safety.

Statutes Considered: *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, ss. 22(1), 22(2)(a), (e) & (f), 22(3)(b) & (j), 25(1)(b).

Authorities Considered: B.C.: Order No. 163-1997, [1997] B.C.I.P.D. No. 21; Order No. 214-1998, [1998] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 7; Order No. 248-1998, [1998] B.C.I.P.C.D. No.42; Order 00-08, [2000] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 8; Order 00-37, [2000] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 40; Order 01-19, [2001] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 20; Order 01-20, [2001] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 21.

Cases Considered: *Canadian Pacific Railway* v. *British Columbia (Information & Privacy Commissioner)*, 2002 BCSC 603; *Kuntz* v. *College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia* (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 219 (C.A.); *Adams* v. *Workers' Compensation Board* (1989), 42 B.C.L.R. (2d) 228 (C.A.).

1.0 INTRODUCTION

[1] By a letter dated September 27, 2001, the applicant made a request to the Law Society of British Columbia ("Law Society") for access to information, under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* ("Act"), in the following terms:

> It suits my political purposes to educate the electorate just how the Law Society actually operates contrary to the interests of British Columbians. Therefore, in my capacity as a candidate for the **Party of Citizens Who Have Decided To Think For Themselves & Be Their Own Politicians**, pursuant to the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act RSBC, I require and hereby demand the names and addresses of each and every person who made a complaint to the Law Society within the calendar year 2000. [bold in original]

[2] The Law Society's October 3, 2001 response said that, while it had the ability to create a record containing the names of complainants using the Law Society's normal computer hardware, software and technical expertise, it declined to provide access to the requested information. The relevant portion of the Law Society's response reads as follows:

> Names and addresses of complainants are their personal information. Under section 22(1) of the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, the disclosure of this personal information would be an unreasonable invasion of third parties' personal privacy.
>
> In making this decision, we have considered all the relevant factors, including your statement that "It suits [your] political purposes to educate the electorate just how the Law Society actually operates contrary to the interests of British Columbians." We have also considered that complaints are normally confidential under Rule 3-3 of the Law Society Rules, that the information was provided to the Law Society by complainants in confidence (section 22(2)(f)), and that disclosure could expose third parties to financial or other harm (section 22(2)(e)), or damage the reputation of any person referred to in the record (section 22(2)(h)).

[3] On October 8, 2001, the applicant requested a review, under Part 5 of the Act, of the Law Society's decision to deny access. Because the matter did not settle in mediation by this Office, I held a written inquiry under Part 5.

[4] After this Office issued the Notice of Written Inquiry, the Law Society gave notice that it intended also to rely on s. 14 and s. 22(3)(b) of the Act. The Law Society also acknowledged that the applicant's request for review raised s. 25(1)(b) as one of the grounds for review.

2.0 ISSUES

[5] The issues raised in this case are as follows:

1. Is the Law Society authorized by s. 14 of the Act to refuse to disclose information?

2. Is the Law Society required by s. 22(1) to refuse to disclose information?

3. Is the Law Society required by s. 25(1)(b) to disclose information?

[6] The Law Society bears the burden, under s. 57(1) of the Act, of establishing that s. 14 authorizes it to refuse to disclose information. Under s. 57(2) of the Act, the applicant has the burden of establishing that the requested information can be disclosed without unreasonably invading third-party personal privacy. Previous decisions have established that the applicant bears the burden of establishing that s. 25(1)(b) requires the Law Society to disclose the requested information.

[7] In light of my decision under s. 22(1), I need not deal with the Law Society's reliance on s. 14 of the Act or the issue of whether it was properly raised.

3.0 DISCUSSION

[8] **3.1 Preliminary Issues** – The applicant has raised two objections about the conduct of this inquiry. I will deal with them before moving onto the substantive issues.

Allegation of Bias

[9] In his initial submission, the applicant makes certain allegations against the Attorney General of British Columbia on the basis that he is a lawyer and is therefore allegedly "a captive of the Law Society." He then says the following about my participation in this inquiry:

> Your problem is that you, too, are a lawyer. You'd better address that in your Reasons because you can be sure it will come up at the Judicial Review in the Supreme Court. Since the Law Society can make or break anyone who requires its franchise to pursue a livelihood in the business, you are in a position where your loyalty to your fellow guild members, and your concern for your own future career prospects, interfere with your ability to make an independent decision about ANYthing [*sic*] to do with it.
>
> For the sake of argument only: everybody knows that it's only the 98% of crooked lawyers who give the other 2% a bad name. Let's say that you happen to fall into that category, i.e. the majority of the membership of the Law Society who are rotten, incompetent miscreants who would better serve society washing dishes somewhere. Let's say you, personally have had a complaint made against you to the Law Society. Now you – hypothetically – have something to hide. You sure don't want me to locate that complainant, and get the dirt on what the Privacy Commissioner did in a previous position, do you? … .
>
> … So you will refuse me the names/addresses I want in order to cover-up for your schoolmates, drinking buddies, collegiates [*sic*], former partners … you name it.
>
> Now back to the real world, i.e. this submission. Since you cannot prove that your own hands are clean enough to judge this matter, you have to pass. I recommend you send it on upstairs to the Supreme Court. Of course, I will then be saying the same things to the Judge.
>
> See the problem? The whole rotten stinking racket known as the "justice system" is so thoroughly riddled with self-interest, its ability to serve the public properly is

> ruined. It's time to clean house. The only way to do that is to shine the light of free inquiry into the shadows where all the vermin have been conducting business, condoned by the Law Society. The only way to do that is to have the aggreived [*sic*] come forward and tell their stories. The only way for that to happen is if I locate them. For which I need their names and addresses. If you prevent me doing that, then you become party to the cover-up.

[10] As I understand it, the applicant alleges that I am actually biased, or that there is a reasonable apprehension that I am biased. As regards any suggestion that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, the argument appears to be that, because I am a lawyer and therefore subject to the Law Society's jurisdiction, a reasonable person would consider that I am biased. As far as any suggestion of actual bias goes, the applicant seems to believe that – even though he framed it as a hypothetical case – disclosure of the disputed information might reveal that someone has in the past complained about me to the Law Society. He also appears to argue that my relationship with lawyers who may have been the subject of complaints, and my self-interest in participating in a supposed cover up in order not to provoke the Law Society's wrath, will incline me to upholding the Law Society's decision here.

[11] I will deal first with the reasonable apprehension of bias issue. Ross J. recently addressed this issue in *Canadian Pacific Railway* v. *British Columbia (Information & Privacy Commissioner)*, 2002 BCSC 603, as follows:

> [49] The test for the apprehension of bias, which has been accepted in subsequent jurisprudence, is that stated by Justice [de] Grandpre in *Committee for Justice and Liberty* v. *Canada (National Energy Board*, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369:
>
> > ... the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude."
> >
> > ...
> >
> > The grounds for this apprehension must, however, be substantial and I entirely agree with the Federal Court of Appeal which refused to accept the suggestion that the test be related to the "very sensitive or scrupulous conscience."
>
> [50] Although the test must be applied to the circumstances of the particular case, there are some useful general principles which can be drawn from the cases, including:
>
> (a) the onus of demonstrating apprehension or the reasonable apprehension of bias lies with the person who is alleging its existence, see *R.* v. *S.(R.D.)*, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484;

> (b) there is a presumption of regularity, a presumption that the member will act fairly, honestly, and impartially, see *Zundel* v. *Citron (C.A.)*, [2000] 4 F.C. 225 (F.C.A.); … .

[12] Actual bias consists of an impermissible partiality that usually, but not always, arises from a personal interest or from animosity connected with a personal circumstance. See, for example, *Kuntz* v. *College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia* (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 219 (C.A.).

[13] The courts have made it clear that allegations of actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias must be proved with evidence, not mere speculation. In *Adams* v. *Workers' Compensation Board* (1989), 42 B.C.L.R. (2d) 228 (C.A.), at para. 13, Gibbs J.A. said the following on this point:

> This case is an exemplification of what appears to have become general and common practice, that of accusing persons vested with the authority to decide rights of parties of bias or reasonable apprehension of it without any extrinsic evidence to support the allegation. It is a practice which, in my opinion, is to be discouraged. An accusation of that nature is an adverse imputation on the integrity of the person against whom it was made. The sting and the doubt about integrity lingers even when the allegation is rejected. It is the kind of allegation easily made but impossible to refute except by a general denial. It ought not to be made unless supported by sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, to a reasonable person, there is a sound basis for apprehending that the person against whom it is made will not bring an impartial mind to bear upon the cause. As I have said earlier, and on other occasions, suspicion is not enough.

[14] In *Kuntz*, above, Southin J.A. agreed that allegations of bias or actual bias should only be made if the party making the allegation provides evidence that gives rise to a rational inference that the allegations have substance. Moreover, in *Committee for Justice and Liberty*, above, de Grandpre J. said that the grounds for an apprehension of bias must be "substantial".

[15] The applicant has not provided any evidence to support his allegations of bias. He relies solely on the fact that I am a lawyer and thus subject to the regulatory authority of the Law Society. He says I will fear for my future career at the hands of the Law Society if I dare to overturn its decision. The Law Society's regulatory authority arises under the *Legal Profession Act* and the Law Society Rules, which are established under the *Legal Profession Act*. The standards of conduct expected of lawyers in British Columbia are clearly set out in that statutory framework. That same framework, and rules of fairness and natural justice under the common law, govern how the Law Society investigates, prosecutes and disciplines lawyers who contravene the framework.

[16] I certainly have no fear that, if I order the Law Society to disclose the disputed information, the Law Society will somehow seek revenge by abusing its legal authority, either now or at some point in the future. The rule of law, which applies to me in the

discharge of my duties and functions under the Act, also applies to the Law Society in its discharge of its functions and duties. I do not think that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – would conclude that there is an apprehension of bias on my part. There is no reasonable apprehension of bias here.

[17] Nor is there any evidence to support an allegation of actual bias, not least because I am not aware of anyone ever having complained to the Law Society about my conduct. Nor do I have any idea which lawyers were the subject of complaints to the Law Society in 2000.

[18] For the above reasons, I decline to recuse myself from this inquiry.

Alleged Lateness of Law Society's Initial Submission

[19] There is a considerable amount of correspondence from the applicant in the material before me regarding what he alleges was the Law Society's failure to deliver its initial submission by the time required in the Notice of Written Inquiry. I have already addressed this concern in a letter to the parties, which I sent after their submissions were exchanged. At the time, I indicated I would consider the Law Society's initial and reply submissions in my deliberations and I have done so. I do not propose to address the applicant's concerns again here, other than to note that it is abundantly clear that the Law Society's initial submission was received by fax before noon on the stipulated day and that the parties' initial submissions were exchanged promptly. The applicant has not at any point suggested he has been prejudiced in his ability to prepare and deliver a reply submission. He did not deliver a reply submission, but in a later letter to my Office acknowledged that this was because he had forgotten the opportunity to do so was available.

[20] **3.2 Public Interest Disclosure** – The applicant's request for review mentions s. 25(1) of the Act and indicates that the Law Society is required to disclose complainants' names in the public interest. Section 25(1) of the Act reads as follows:

> **Information must be disclosed if in the public interest**
>
> 25(1) Whether or not a request for access is made, the head of a public body must, without delay, disclose to the public, to an affected group of people or to an applicant, information

[21] As I noted in Order 01-20, [2001] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 21, s. 25(1)(b) entails a two-step analysis. The first stage requires a determination of whether there is a sufficiently clear and compelling interest in disclosure of the information in question. The second step is to decide whether there is an urgent or compelling need for disclosure of that information.

[22] I find no grounds, applying this two-part analysis, on which to conclude that s. 25(1)(b) requires disclosure of this personal information. In arriving at this conclusion, I have considered the applicant's arguments that the Law Society "ought to be

answerable to the people", that it is allegedly "perverting its mandate so as to cover up wrongdoing by its members", and that the Law Society's failure to protect the public interest is a "political issue". The fact that the applicant seeks to remedy these alleged wrongs by "seeking office in the Legislature" (p. 1, initial submission) does not change this conclusion. Nor does the applicant's argument that he needs the complainants' names to "clean house", as he puts it, and so as to "shine the light of free enquiry into the shadows" (p. 2, initial submission).

[23] **3.3 Third-Party Personal Privacy** – Section 22(1) of the Act requires the Law Society to refuse to disclose information if the disclosure would unreasonably invade the personal privacy of a third party. Section 22(3) sets out a number of presumed unreasonable invasions of third-party privacy, while s. 22(2) lists some of the relevant circumstances that must be considered in deciding whether disclosure is prohibited. The relevant portions of s. 22 are as follows:

> **Disclosure harmful to personal privacy**
>
> 22 (1) The head of a public body must refuse to disclose personal information to an applicant if the disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy.
>
> (2) In determining under subsection (1) or (3) whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy, the head of a public body must consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether
>
> (a) the disclosure is desirable for the purpose of subjecting the activities of the government of British Columbia or a public body to public scrutiny,
>
> …
>
> (c) the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of the applicant's rights,
>
> …
>
> (e) the third party will be exposed unfairly to financial or other harm,
>
> (f) the personal information has been supplied in confidence,
>
> …
>
> (3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy if
>
> …
>
> (b) the personal information was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation,
>
> …

> (j) the personal information consists of the third party's name, address, or telephone number and is to be used for mailing lists or solicitations by telephone or other means.

[24] I will consider s. 22(3)(j) first.

Solicitation using personal information

[25] The names of individuals who complained to the Law Society in 2000 about specific lawyers are clearly the complainants' personal information. It is also clear that, as the Law Society argues, the applicant wishes to have these individuals' names in order to contact them and solicit their involvement in his political activities. Under s. 22(3)(j), a disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy if

> … the personal information consists of the third-party's name, address, or telephone number and is to be used for mailing lists or solicitations by telephone or other means.

[26] The following passage appears at p. 2 of the applicant's request for review:

> Seeking a remedy, I intend to address the electorate with a proposal for an initiative entreating the government to enact a law which will hold justice system insiders **properly** accountable. For that I need to be able to contact people who have been ill-served, robbed, and devastated every-which-way by certain Law Society franchisees, then further abused by the discipline committee, so that I can solicit contributions of their experiences, donations of money and eventually their votes. I need the names/addresses at issue to do my own survey, the results of which I can then present to British Columbians as part of my political platform. [original emphasis]

[27] The applicant's intention to contact complainants is confirmed by his initial submission, as quoted above. This is further evidence that he intends to use the information to solicit these third parties by telephone or other means, thus triggering s. 22(3)(j) of the Act. It does not matter that he intends to solicit donations of money for, or participation in, his activities for political and not commercial purposes. The term "solicitation" in s. 22(3)(j) encompasses solicitations for purposes other than commercial purposes. See, for example, Order No. 214-1998, [1998] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 7, and Order No. 248-1998, [1998] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 42. It follows that disclosure of the requested information is presumed, under s. 22(3)(j), to be an unreasonable invasion of third-party personal privacy.

Compiled as part of a law enforcement investigation

[28] The Law Society argues that the presumed unreasonable invasion of personal privacy under s. 22(3)(b) also applies. That section provides that a disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy if

> … the personal information was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation.

[29] A number of cases affirm that disciplinary proceedings instituted by a self-regulating profession acting under statutory authority are law enforcement proceedings for the purposes of s. 15 of the Act. See, for example, Order 00-08, [2000] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 8, a case involving the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia. See, also, Order No. 163-1997, [1997] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 21, in which my predecessor decided that the Law Society's investigation of a complaint against a lawyer constituted law enforcement proceedings as contemplated by s. 15 of the Act. I accept that, for the purposes of s. 22(3)(b), the Law Society's disciplinary investigations under the *Legal Profession Act* and the Law Society Rules are also investigations "into a possible violation of law" for the purposes of s. 22(3)(b).

[30] The question remains whether the complainants' names were compiled as part of "an investigation into a possible violation of law" undertaken by the Law Society. In support of its position on this point, the Law Society relies on an affidavit sworn by Jean Whittow, Q.C., who is the Law Society's Deputy Executive Director and Director of Discipline and Complaints. She is responsible for managing the Law Society's regulatory functions, including the handling of complaints. Paragraph 12 of her affidavit reads as follows:

> 12. The information, which is the subject matter of this inquiry, is the names and addresses of complainants in the year 2000. The identity of the complainant is an integral part of the complaint to the Law Society. It is only in the rarest of circumstances that the Law Society will proceed on an anonymous complaint. A complaint commences the investigation into possible violations of the *Legal Profession Act* and/or the Rules or standards of professional conduct. As such the information sought by the Applicant was compiled and is identifiable as part of investigations by the Law Society into possible violations of law.

[31] I am satisfied, on the basis of Jean Whittow's evidence, that the name of an individual who complains to the Law Society is personal information compiled as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law. Jean Whittow's evidence supports the view that even the initial review of a complaint is part of an investigation for the purposes of this section. I accept that every complaint made to the Law Society is, to some extent, looked into and that the personal information supplied at the outset, as part of the complaint, is compiled as part of an "investigation". Accordingly, disclosure of the requested information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of third-party personal privacy under s. 22(3)(b).

Information supplied in confidence

[32] In deciding whether a disclosure of personal information would unreasonably invade personal privacy, a public body is required to consider all relevant circumstances, including those set out in s. 22(2). The Law Society says the relevant circumstance set out in s. 22(2)(f) – which is quoted above – applies here. It argues that the criteria expressed in Order 00-37, [2000] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 40, regarding the determination of whether a supply of information will be found to be implicitly confidential, should be applied here.

[33] The Law Society argues (at para. 25 of its initial submission) that, taken together, the *Legal Profession Act* and the Law Society Rules

> … provide that confidentiality and solicitor client privilege are to be maintained subject only to disclosure necessary for the purposes of the *Legal Profession Act* or Law Society Rules. The relevant sections of the *Legal Profession Act* are ss. 87 and 88.

[34] The relevant portions of s. 87(2) and 88(3) of the *Legal Profession Act* read as follows:

> (2) If a person has made a complaint to the society respecting a lawyer, neither the society nor the complainant can be required to disclose or produce the complaint and the complaint is not admissible in any proceeding, except with the written consent of the complainant.
>
> …
>
> (3) A person who, during the course of an investigation, audit, inquiry or hearing under this Act, acquires information or records that are confidential or subject to solicitor client privilege must not disclose that information or those records to any person except for a purpose contemplated by this Act or the rules.

[35] The Law Society also cites Rule 3-3 of the Law Society Rules, which imposes non-disclosure requirements on the Law Society respecting certain information, including complaint-related information:

> **Confidentiality of complaints**
>
> 3-3(1) No one is permitted to disclose any information or records that form part of the Executive Director's investigation of a complaint or the Complainants' Review Committee's review of it except for the purpose of complying with the objectives of the Act or with these Rules. … .

[36] According to the Law Society, these provisions, read together, make it clear the "information supplied by complainants, including their names and other identifying information, is supplied in confidence and is intended to be kept confidential", except to

the extent that it can or must be disclosed for the purposes of the *Legal Profession Act* or the Law Society Rules (para. 28, initial submission).

[37] In Order 00-37, I adopted, for the purposes of determining if there has been an implicitly confidential supply of information under s. 21(1)(b) of the Act, factors that had been expressed in a decision dealing with the Ontario version of s. 21(1) of the Act. Although those criteria may be useful in some s. 22 cases, they do not exhaust the grounds on which confidential supply can arise for the purposes of s. 22(2)(f).

[38] As is established by Exhibit "A" to Jean Whittow's affidavit, the Law Society's own Website information for prospective complainants expressly stipulates that "all information provided to the Law Society [by a complainant] will be forwarded to the lawyer for his or her response." It goes on to say the following:

> Under the *Legal Profession Act*, information obtained during an investigation is generally confidential and cannot be used in other proceedings except with consent. The Law Society, however, is subject to the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*. As a result, information gathered by the Law Society may be disclosed, on request, to other persons whose interests are affected by it.

[39] The Law Society's information brochure for potential complainants, a copy of which forms Exhibit "B" to Jean Whittow's affidavit, contains the following passage:

> Any personal information you give in connection with your complaint will only be used to follow up on your complaint and for statistical purposes. The information is collected under the *Legal Profession Act* and the Law Society Rules. Questions about the collection of this information can be directed to a Law Society Complaints Officer, 945 Cambie Street, Vancouver, B.C. V6B 4Z9, telephone 669-2533.

[40] I conclude that the disclosure restrictions created by the above-quoted *Legal Profession Act* and Law Society Rules, together with the Law Society's above-quoted confidentiality commitment to the public, suffice to establish confidentiality of supply for the purposes of s. 22(2)(f) of the Act. In my view, a member of the public who complains to the Law Society about a lawyer provides her or his personal information to the Law Society for that restricted purpose and with a reasonable expectation that the personal information is received and will be kept confidential.

[41] This conclusion is not affected by the fact that a complainant is warned that the lawyer will receive, as a matter of procedural fairness, a copy of the complaint and personal information of the complainant. This limited disclosure does not preclude the conclusion that, as between the complainant and the world, the personal information is supplied in confidence.

[42] I will note here that the statutory confidentiality provisions cited above differ markedly from the limited statutory non-disclosure provisions of the *Workers' Compensation Act* discussed in Order 01-19, [2001] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 20.

[43] For the above reasons, I find that s. 22(2)(f) is a relevant circumstance and that it favours the conclusion that s. 22 prohibits the Law Society from disclosing the complainants' names to the applicant.

Other relevant circumstances?

[44] The Law Society also argues that the circumstances in s. 22(2)(e) (unfair exposure to harm) and s. 22(2)(h) (unfair damage to reputation) are relevant here. In light of the above findings, I need not consider whether the evidence establishes that these circumstances are relevant in this case.

Disclosure of the personal information is prohibited

[45] The applicant has failed to rebut either of the presumed unreasonable invasions of personal privacy that apply to the disputed information. He has not pointed to any relevant circumstances that support disclosure and I am not able to identify any in his initial submission. Certainly, I do not consider the factor in s. 22(2)(a) applies to this particular information. Nor has the applicant shown that the information is somehow relevant to a fair determination of his legal rights under s. 22(2)(c).

[46] On the other hand, the circumstance in s. 22(2)(f) does apply, and it supports the conclusion that disclosure of the disputed information would unreasonably invade third-party personal privacy. I find that s. 22(1) requires the Law Society to refuse to disclose the disputed information to the applicant.

4.0 CONCLUSION

[47] For the reasons given above, under s. 58(2)(c) of the Act, I require the Law Society to refuse access to the information it has withheld from the applicant under s. 22(1) of the Act. No order is necessary respecting ss. 14 or 25(1).

May 15, 2002

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

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David Loukidelis
Information and Privacy Commissioner
for British Columbia