Order F26-47

CITY OF VANCOUVER

Elizabeth Barker
Director of Adjudication

June 16, 2026
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Summary: An applicant requested access to records from the City of Vancouver's (City) investigation of a suite in the strata building where he resides. The City refused access to some parts of the records under disclosure exceptions in the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*. The adjudicator found that s. 22(1) (unreasonable invasion of third party personal privacy) applied to some information, but s. 25(1)(b) (disclosure in the public interest) did not apply. The adjudicator ordered the City to provide the applicant access to a small amount of information to which s. 22(1) did not apply.

Statutes Considered: *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, RSBC 1996, c. 165, ss. 22(1), 22(2)(a), 22(2)(b), 22(2)(c), 22(3)(b), 22(4)(b), 22(4)(c), 22(4)(h), 22(4)(i), 22(4)(j) and 25(1)(b).

INTRODUCTION

[1] An individual (applicant) owns and resides in a strata unit in the City of Vancouver (City). He requested access to the City's records of its investigation of another unit in the same building for contraventions of zoning and development bylaws. The City disclosed the requested records but withheld some information in them under ss. 15(1)(l) (harm to security of property or computer system) and 22(1) (unreasonable invasion of third party personal privacy) of the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (FIPPA).[1]

[2] The applicant asked the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC) to review the City's decision to refuse him access to information in the records. He also complained that the City should have, without delay, disclosed all the requested information to him under s. 25(1)(b) (disclosure

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[1] All references to section numbers in this order refer to FIPPA unless otherwise stated.

in the public interest).[2] Mediation by the OIPC did not resolve the parties' dispute and it proceeded to this inquiry.

[3] Before the inquiry commenced, the City reconsidered its severing decision and gave the applicant access to the information that it had withheld under s. 15(1)(l). Therefore, that information and s. 15(1)(l) are not in dispute and I will not consider them in this inquiry.

[4] The City and the applicant provided written inquiry submissions. The individual who lived in the unit the City investigated (the Resident) chose not to participate in the inquiry.

Preliminary Matters

The Applicant's Submission

[5] The applicant's inquiry submission lists documents that he says he relies on, but he only provided some of them for my review.[3] The OIPC's registrar of inquiries told him that he must provide a copy of anything he wanted considered.[4] The applicant did not dispute what the registrar said about this, nor did he send the missing documents.

[6] In addition, the applicant's materials focus largely on the litigation he is pursuing against the other owners of the building's strata units and discuss his concerns about the building's structure. FIPPA does not authorize me to rule on those matters and they are outside my jurisdiction. Therefore, while I have read all of the applicant's materials and arguments, I will only discuss the aspects that are relevant to the issues I am deciding in this inquiry.

Applicant's Request for a "hybrid (online)" Inquiry

[7] In keeping with the OIPC's standard practices, the OIPC's registrar of inquiries invited written submissions when she emailed the notice of inquiry and the *OIPC's Instructions for Written Inquiries* to the parties. She added, "If you

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[2] The applicant's April 3, 2025 letter of complaint to the City indicates the part of s. 25 he is relying on is s. 25(1)(b).

[3] He lists those documents on p. 1 of his inquiry submission. I only have the City's April 11, 2024 letter responding to the access request, the applicant's May 11, 2024 letter to the OIPC requesting a review, and 264 pages of court transcripts from the applicant's lawsuit against the strata.

[4] Some of the missing listed documents appeared to be communications from the OIPC's mediation process, so the registrar also advised that mediation material would not be considered. The OIPC's *Instructions for Written Inquiries* (https://www.oipc.bc.ca/documents/guidance-documents/1658) says that "mediation material" refers generally to communications that relate to offers or attempts to resolve the matter during mediation, and that the OIPC will not consider mediation material in reaching a decision and issuing an order.

require accommodations in order to participate effectively in these proceedings, please call or email me to discuss your needs."[5] Neither party contacted the registrar to request accommodation and they both sent written submissions.

[8] In his written submission, the applicant makes what I understand to be a request that the inquiry proceed by way of both oral and written submissions. He says, "It is also my respectful submission that written inquiry is not the ideal means to proceed in my view, and a hybrid (online) model may work best in this case."[6] He adds that he has certain physical conditions and would seek accommodation if the inquiry proceeds in that way.

[9] The City says it does not support the applicant's request for a hybrid model and submits that a written inquiry is appropriate in this matter.

[10] Section 56(4) of FIPPA says that the commissioner may decide if, during an inquiry, representations are to be made orally or in writing.[7] I recognize that an oral hearing may be appropriate where witness credibility is at issue or cross-examination would assist the adjudicator to assess the evidence and decide the issues. However, I have carefully reviewed the written materials before me and that is not the case here. The City provided only written argument and included no evidence other than the records in dispute. I cannot see any credibility issues to be decided, nor did the applicant identify any.

[11] I find the parties' written submissions adequately set out their positions and are sufficient for me to decide the issues in dispute. There is only a remote possibility that oral submissions and evidence might help me to decide and it is outweighed by the administrative inconvenience and increased resources required to conduct a hybrid model inquiry. Therefore, I decline to grant the applicant's request for a "hybrid (online)" inquiry because I am not persuaded that oral submissions or evidence are necessary or desirable to fairly decide the issues in this inquiry.

ISSUES

[12] There are two issues to be decided in this inquiry:

1. Whether s. 25(1)(b) requires the City to disclose the information without delay; and
2. Whether the City is required to refuse to disclose the information at issue under s. 22(1) of FIPPA.

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[5] Registrar's February 10, 2026 email to the parties.
[6] Applicant's submission at p. 3. He adds that he has certain disabilities for which he would seek accommodation if the inquiry proceeds by way of a hybrid (online) model.
[7] The OIPC's consistent practice for the last 20 years is to conduct inquiries by way of written submissions.

[13] Section 57(2) places the burden on the applicant to prove that disclosing the information at issue under s. 22(1) would not unreasonably invade a third party's personal privacy. However, the City has the initial burden of proving that the information qualifies as personal information.[8]

[14] There is no statutory burden with respect to s. 25(1). Previous orders have said that it is in the interests of both parties to provide whatever evidence and arguments they can to assist the adjudicator with the s. 25(1) determination.[9] I agree with this approach and will adopt it here.

DISCUSSION

Background

[15] The applicant owns and resides in a suite in a strata condominium. Several years ago, the City investigated structural changes to another suite in the building. The investigation revealed that a wall had been removed from the suite without a permit and contrary to City development and zoning bylaws. The City's chief building official issued an order against two limited corporations (the Companies) requiring them, amongst other things, to obtain the required permits and remove the unauthorized alterations. The order was posted on the front door of the building. Some time later, the applicant asked the City to provide him with access to the records about its investigation.

Records and information at issue

[16] There are 34 pages of partially severed records and they all relate to the City's investigation. The records are as follows:

- a letter from the City's property use inspector addressed to the Companies (partially severed);
- two inspection reports signed by the City's property use inspector (partially severed);
- an order from the City's chief building official addressed to the Companies (partially severed);
- two photographs of the partially severed order posted on the front door of the building;
- a two-email exchange between the City's chief building official and a clerk (partially severed);
- a screen print of a database inquiry (completely disclosed); and
- a "History Report" regarding the zoning and development bylaw violation (partially severed).

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[8] Order 03-41, 2003 CanLII 49220 (BCIPC) at paras 9-11.
[9] For example, Order 02-38, 2022 CanLII 42472 (BC IPC) at para 39 and Order F25-85, 2025 BCIPC 99 (CanLII) at para 9.

Public Interest Override, s. 25(1)(b)

[17] The relevant parts of s. 25 state the following:

> 25 (1) Whether or not a request for access is made, the head of a public body must, without delay, disclose to the public, to an affected group of people or to an applicant, information
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> …
>
> (b) the disclosure of which is, for any other reason, clearly in the public interest.
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> (2) Subsection (1) applies despite any other provision of this Act.

[18] If s. 25(1) applies, it overrides every other provision in FIPPA, including the exceptions to disclosure and the privacy protections in FIPPA, so the threshold for proactive disclosure under s. 25(1) is very high.

[19] What constitutes "clearly in the public interest" under s. 25(1)(b) is contextual and determined on a case-by-case basis. To determine what is clearly in the public interest, the analysis must consider whether a disinterested and reasonable observer, knowing what the information is and knowing all of the circumstances, would conclude that the disclosure is plainly and obviously in the public interest.

[20] When deciding whether s. 25(1)(b) applies, past orders have established a two-part test. First, I must determine whether the information concerns a matter that engages the public interest. If so, the next question is whether the nature of the information itself meets the high threshold for disclosure.[10]

Does the matter engage the public interest?

[21] Indicia that a matter engages the public interest may include whether the matter is the subject of widespread debate in the media, the Legislature, or by officers of the Legislature or oversight bodies, and whether the matter relates to a systemic problem rather than to an isolated situation.

[22] The City submits that it is plain and obvious on the face of the records that s. 25(1)(b) does not apply and there is no objectively material public importance to the disclosure of the records.[11]

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[10] For the s. 25(1) principles discussed here see OIPC Investigation Report F16-02 at pp. 26-27 available at https://www.oipc.bc.ca/reports/investigation-reports/, and the many orders that have followed it, such as Order F23-94, 2023 BCIPC 110 at paras 9-13.Given my finding, it is unnecessary to set out the factors to consider under the second part of the test.

[11] City's submission at para 17.

[23] What the applicant says illustrates the importance of the information to him as an individual who feels aggrieved by the actions of other residents in the strata. For example, he says:

> Here, my circumstances *are* **urgent**, *and* they *include* addressing, *inter alia*, public [strata] interest, which militates in favor of **immediate, proactive disclosure.** My BC empty-home declaration has sought an exemption on the basis that my home is **uninhabitable**, given that I am particularly at risk from exposure to mycotoxins (mold toxins), yet to be remediated from my common property.[12]

[24] Notwithstanding his statements, I note the applicant does not actually explain how the disputed information engages the public's interest or provide evidence that suggests it does. I can see nothing in the records or the inquiry materials that indicates the public has ever expressed any interest in the isolated matter the disputed information is about. The fact that the underlying investigation is extremely important to the applicant is not enough to establish that it is a matter that engages the public interest.

[25] As a result, I find the information in dispute is not about a matter that engages the public interest and disclosure is not "clearly in the public interest" under s. 25(1)(b). Therefore, the City is not required to disclose the information under s. 25(1)(b).

Unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy, s. 22

[26] The City is withholding all of the information in dispute under s. 22(1). Section 22(1) requires public bodies to refuse to disclose personal information if disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy.[13] There are four steps in the s. 22(1) analysis and I will apply each step under the subheadings that follow.[14]

Personal information

[27] Section 22 only applies to personal information, so the first step in the s. 22 analysis is to determine if the information that has been severed from the records is personal information.

[28] Personal information is defined in FIPPA as "recorded information about an identifiable individual other than contact information." Contact information is defined as "information to enable an individual at a place of business to be

[12] Applicant's April 3, 2025 letter of complaint to the City at p. 4.
[13] A "third party" is defined in Schedule 1 of FIPPA as any person, group of persons or organization other than the person who made the access request or a public body.
[14] Order F15-03, 2015 BCIPC 3 (CanLII) at para 58 sets out a summary of the steps in a s. 22 analysis which I follow here.

contacted and includes the name, position name or title, business telephone number, business address, business email or business fax number of the individual."[15] Whether information is contact information depends on the context in which that information appears.[16]

[29] The City submits that the information severed from the records is solely personal information about a third party and it is not contact information to enable the third party to be contacted at a place of business. I understand the City is referring to the Resident.

[30] The applicant does not say anything about whether the information in dispute is personal information.

[31] The severed information consists of the following:

- the Resident's name, email address and phone numbers;[17]
- the Resident's suite number;[18]
- the Companies' joint mailing address (their names have been disclosed);[19]
- a photograph of the interior of the Resident's suite;[20]
- the first page of the building's development permit;[21]
- the "permit drawing" for the suite;[22]
- details about the Resident's life that they shared with the property use inspector;[23] and
- the location of another suite which was responsible for flooding in the Resident's suite.[24]

[32] I find that the Resident's name, email address, phone numbers, suite number, and the photograph of the objects and furnishings in the Resident's suite is personal information. This information is about the Resident as an identifiable individual and there is nothing to indicate it is information to enable them to be contacted for a business purpose, so I'm satisfied it is not contact information.

[33] I also find that the information about the location of the suite that was responsible for flood damage is information about an identifiable individual. I

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[15] See Schedule 1 of FIPPA for the definitions of personal information and contact information.
[16] Order F15-32, 2015 BCIPC 35 (CanLII), at para 15; Order F08-03, 2008 CanLII 13321, at para 82.
[17] On pp. 3, 8, 21 and 22 of the Records.
[18] This appears many times throughout the Records.
[19] On pp. 1, 3, 8 and 13 of the Records.
[20] The same photo of the room appears on pp. 4 and 10 of the Records.
[21] The permit appears on pp. 6 and 12 of the Records. The text of the permit clearly establishes it was issued before November 16, 1994.
[22] The same permit drawing appears on pp. 7 and 12 of the Records.
[23] On pp. 8-9 and 30 of the Records.
[24] On p. 31 of the Records.

recognize that the applicant may already know the identity of the individual in this suite because they both live in the same building, so if the suite's location were disclosed, the applicant would learn about that person's role in the flooding. While I am not certain the applicant knows this individual, it is sufficiently likely that the applicant could ascertain their identity, so I find the suite's location is information about an identifiable individual. There is nothing to suggest that information is about a business, so I also find it is not contact information. As a result, I find the location of the suite responsible for the flooding is personal information.

[34] On the other hand, I find that the name of an architect and two City officials and their addresses and phone numbers that appear on the development permit are not personal information. This information is clearly about their business activities and it appears on the permit to enable them to be contacted at their place of business. Therefore, while this is information about identifiable individuals, I find it is not personal information because it is contact information.

[35] Further, the other information withheld from the development permit, such as the lot size, total number of dwelling units, etc., is not about any identifiable individual. For that reason, I find it is not personal information.

[36] I also find the permit drawing of the suite, does not contain any information about identifiable individuals, so it is not personal information.[25]

[37] Finally, I find the names and addresses of corporations on the development permit as well as the Companies' joint address are not personal information. This information is about corporations, not identifiable individuals, and corporations do not have personal privacy rights under s. 22(1) FIPPA.[26] The City does not explain how corporation names and addresses meet the definition of personal information, and I am not satisfied that they do.

[38] In summary, s. 22(1) does not authorize or require the City to refuse access to the information that I found is not personal information, namely the Companies' joint address or any information in the development permit and the permit drawing. In the next steps of the s. 22 analysis, I will only consider the information that I found is personal information, specifically: the Resident's name, email address, phone numbers, suite number, the photograph of the interior of their suite, and the details of their life that appear in the records.

[25] I understand the permit drawing is the original layout from when the building was constructed decades ago.
[26] For past orders that have said the same thing see: Order F23-108, 2023 BCIPC 124 (CanLII) at para 44; Order F23-91, 2023 BCIPC 107 at para 119; Order F17-39, 2017 BCIPC 43 at para 75.

Not an unreasonable invasion, s. 22(4)

[39] The second step in the s. 22 analysis is to determine if the personal information falls into any of the types of information listed in s. 22(4). If s. 22(4) applies, then disclosure would not be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy.

[40] The City submits s. 22(4) does not apply. The applicant says, "ss. 22(4)(b), (c), (h), (i)(i) and (i)(iii)-(vi), and (j) of *FIPPA* may well be applicable".[27] Those provisions state as follows:

> 22(4) A disclosure of personal information is not an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy if
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> …
>
> (b) there are compelling circumstances affecting anyone's health or safety and notice of disclosure is mailed to the last known address of the third party,
>
> (c) an enactment of British Columbia or Canada authorizes the disclosure,
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> …
>
> (h) the information is about expenses incurred by the third party while travelling at the expense of a public body,
>
> (i) the disclosure, in respect of
>
> > (i) a licence, a permit or any other similar discretionary benefit, or
> >
> > (ii) a degree, a diploma or a certificate,
> >
> > reveals any of the following with respect to the applicable item in subparagraph (i) or (ii):
> >
> > (iii) the name of the third party to whom the item applies;
> >
> > (iv) what the item grants or confers on the third party or authorizes the third party to do;
> >
> > (v) the status of the item;
> >
> > (vi) the date the item was conferred or granted;
> >
> > (vii) the period of time the item is valid;
> >
> > (viii) the date the item expires, or
>
> (j) the disclosure, in respect of a discretionary benefit of a financial nature granted to a third party by a public body, not including personal information referred to in subsection (3) (c), reveals any of the following with respect to the benefit:
>
> > (i) the name of the third party to whom the benefit applies;
> >
> > (ii) what the benefit grants to the third party;

[27] All these quotes come from the applicant's submission at p. 3.

(iii) the date the benefit was granted;
(iv) the period of time the benefit is valid;
(v) the date the benefit ceases.

[41] Other than asserting these provisions apply, the only additional thing the applicant says is that s. 22(4)(h) applies if it "is arguable if the judiciary is recognized as a 'public' body".[28] The applicant does not elaborate further, and it is not clear to me what he means by this. Absent any further explanation, I cannot see how s. 22(4)(h) or any other part of s. 22(4) is engaged in this case. Therefore, I find that s. 22(4) does not apply to any of the personal information in the records.

Presumptions, s. 22(3)

[42] The third step in the s. 22 analysis is to determine whether s. 22(3) applies to any personal information. If so, disclosing that personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of third-party personal privacy.

[43] The City submits that s. 22(3)(b) applies. Section 22(3)(b) states that a disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy if the personal information was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation. The applicant says the s. 22(4) provisions he claims are applicable "militate against the *presumptions* in s. 22(3) of *FIPPA*".[29]

[44] Based on the context and content of the records, I can clearly see that all of the personal information was gathered and compiled as part of an investigation into possible violations of the City's Zoning and Development By-law No. 3575 and Building By-Law No. 12511. I also agree with previous orders that have consistently said that a violation of a municipal bylaw is a violation of law for the purposes of s. 22(3)(b).[30] Consequently, I find that s. 22(3)(b) applies to all of the personal information in the records and disclosure is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of third-party personal privacy.

Analysis of relevant circumstances and conclusion

[45] The fourth step in the s. 22 analysis is to determine whether disclosure of the personal information constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy, after considering all the relevant circumstances, including those

[28] Applicant's submission at footnote 13.
[29] Applicant's submission at p. 3.
[30] See, for example, Order F21-40, 2021 BCIPC 48 at para 59 citing, among others, Order 01-12, 2001 CanLII 21566 (BCIPC) at para 17.

listed in s. 22(2). It is at this step that any applicable s. 22(3) presumptions may be rebutted.

[46] The City does not say anything about s. 22(2) or other circumstances that might be relevant to consider in this case. Instead, it says that the onus is on the applicant to rebut the s. 22(3) presumption, and it reserves the right to reply after seeing the applicant's submission. Ultimately, the City chose not to provide a reply submission.

[47] The applicant submits that ss. 22(2)(a) to (c) "were not properly considered, nor applied, in light of all the relevant evidence."[31]

[48] Given what the applicant says, I will consider ss. 22(2)(a), (b) and (c). I will also consider whether the applicant already knows the personal information.

Public scrutiny of a public body - s. 22(2)(a)

[49] Section 22(2)(a) asks whether disclosure of the personal information is desirable for subjecting the activities of a public body to public scrutiny. If s. 22(2)(a) applies, then this factor will weigh in favour of disclosure. The purpose of s. 22(2)(a) is to make public bodies more accountable, and not to scrutinize the activities of individual third parties.[32]

[50] There is only a small amount of personal information at issue, and it is limited to what took place in one individual's suite in the building and the location of the suite that caused flooding. There is nothing in the applicant's submission or the records that suggests the personal information at issue would provide the public with anything of value in terms of scrutinizing how the City operates.

Promoting public health and safety – s. 22(2)(b)

[51] Section 22(2)(b) is about whether disclosure of the personal information would likely promote public health and safety or promote the protection of the environment. The applicant does not explain how or why s. 22(2)(b) is relevant in this case. Absent any explanation, and based on my understanding of the content and context of the records, I find the applicant has not established that disclosing the personal information would promote public health, safety or the protection of the environment.

[31] Applicant's submission at p. 3.
[32] Order F18-47, 2018 BCIPC 50 at para 32; Order F16-14, 2016 BCIPC 16 at para 40.

Fair determination of the applicant's rights – s. 22(2)(c)

[52] Section 22(2)(c) requires a public body to consider whether the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of the applicant's rights. Past orders have said that s. 22(2)(c) applies where the following circumstances exist:

1. The right in question must be a legal right drawn from the common law or a statute, as opposed to a non-legal right based only on moral or ethical grounds;

2. The right must be related to a proceeding which is either under way or is contemplated, not a proceeding that has already been completed;

3. The withheld personal information must have some bearing on, or significance for, the determination of the right in question; and

4. The personal information must be necessary in order to prepare for the proceeding or to ensure a fair hearing.[33]

[53] The applicant's submission refers to his lawsuits and given what he says about them, I understand they ended unsuccessfully for him.[34] He does not explain how the personal information at issue in this inquiry would have any bearing on, or is necessary to prepare for, a proceeding that is underway or contemplated. For these reasons, I find the applicant has not established that the personal information in the records is relevant to a fair determination of his rights.

Applicant's existing knowledge of the personal information

[54] Past orders have held that an applicant's existing knowledge of disputed information is a factor that may weigh in favour of disclosing that information.[35]

[55] This factor is relevant to the Resident's suite number. The City has, through inconsistent severing and its April 11, 2024 response to the access request, disclosed the suite number in the records. Further, the photograph of the order as it was posted on the front door of the building disclosed the suite number. Moreover, the court transcripts that the applicant provided, as well as his letter of complaint to the City and his request for review to the OIPC show he

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[33] Order 01-07, 2001 CanLII 21561 (BCIPC) at para 31; Order F16-36, 2016 BCIPC 40 (CanLII) at paras 39-65.
[34] His submission includes footnotes that lead to his own affidavits and exhibits from his lawsuits against the owners of the strataplan and two named individuals, but he did not provide those documents for my review or explain how they are relevant to the issues in this inquiry.
[35] For examples see: Order F23-13, 2023 BCIPC 15 (CanLII) at para 184; Order F20-13, 2020 BCIPC 15 at para 73; Order F18-30, 2018 BCIPC 33 at para 41.

already knows the suite number.[36] I find this factor weighs strongly in favour of concluding that disclosure of the suite number would not result in an unreasonable invasion of the Resident's personal privacy. However, this finding is limited to the suite number because there is nothing to suggest that the applicant knows the other personal information that has been severed from the records.

Conclusion – s. 22(1)

[56] I found that only some of the information withheld from the records is personal information, specifically: the Resident's name, email address, phone numbers, suite number, the photograph of the interior of their suite, the details of their life that appear in the records, and the location of the suite that caused flooding. At the same time, I found the following information is not personal information: the Companies' joint address, the information in the development permit, and the information in the permit drawing.

[57] I found that s. 22(4) does not apply to the personal information. I also found that all of the personal information was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, so disclosing it is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy under s. 22(3)(b).

[58] There is only one circumstance that weighs in favour of disclosure and that is the fact that the applicant obviously already knows the suite number. I find that this is sufficient in the particulars of this case to rebut the s. 22(3)(b) presumption that applies to the suite number, so disclosing it would not be an unreasonable invasion of third party personal privacy. However, I find the s. 22(3)(b) presumption has not been rebutted for the rest of the personal information. There is nothing to suggest the applicant already knows this information and the other circumstances that I considered, specifically ss. 22(2)(a), (b) and (c), do not weigh in favour of disclosing it.

[59] Therefore, the City is required to refuse to disclose the following information under s. 22(1): the Resident's name, email address, phone numbers, the photograph of the interior of their suite, the details of the Resident's life that appear in the records and the location of another suite which was responsible for flooding in the Resident's suite. The City is not required or authorized by s. 22(1) to refuse to disclose the Resident's suite number, the Companies' joint address or any information in the development permit and the permit drawing.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, I make the following order under s. 58 of FIPPA:

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[36] Applicant's April 3, 2025 letter to the City and his May 11, 2024 letter to the OIPC.

1. Subject to item 2 below, I require the City to refuse to disclose the information in dispute under s. 22(1).

2. Section 22(1) does not apply to the suite number where it appears throughout the Records, the Companies' joint address on pages 1, 3, 8 and 13 of the Records, the development permit on pages 6 and 12 of the Records, or the permit drawing on pages 7 and 12 of the Records. The City is required to disclose that information to the applicant.

3. The City must copy the OIPC registrar of inquiries on the cover letter and records it sends to the applicant in compliance with item #2 above.

Pursuant to s. 59(1) of FIPPA, the City is required to comply with this order by **July 29, 2026**.

June 16, 2026

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

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Elizabeth Barker, Director of Adjudication

OIPC Files: F24-97055 and F25-01040