Office of the Information & Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia

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Order F18-16

UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA

Meganne Cameron
Adjudicator

May 15, 2018

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Summary: The applicant requested the names of all donors who donated over $3,000 to the University of Victoria between October 1, 2015 and September 15, 2016, along with the amount they donated. The University provided some information to the applicant, but withheld other information pursuant to ss. 17(1) (harm to financial interests), 21(1) (harm to business interests of a third party), and s. 22 (unreasonable invasion of personal privacy). The adjudicator determined that the University was authorized under s. 17 of FIPPA to withhold some of the information and required by s. 22 to refuse to disclose other information. A small amount of information was ordered to be disclosed to the applicant. Given the findings, it was not necessary to also consider s. 21.

Statutes Considered: *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, ss. 17(1) and 22, 22(2)(a), 22(3)(f).

INTRODUCTION

[1] The applicant asked that the University of Victoria (University) disclose the names of all donors who made donations or gifts to the University that were greater than $3,000 between October 1, 2015 and September 15, 2016 along with the amount that was donated. The University released some of the responsive records but withheld information pursuant to s. 17(1) (harm to financial interests) and s. 22 (unreasonable invasion of personal privacy) of the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (FIPPA).

[2] The applicant asked the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC) to review the University's decision to withhold the information in dispute. Subsequently, the University notified a third party pursuant to s. 23 of FIPPA. The third party objected to the disclosure of some of the information in dispute under s. 21(1) (harm to third party business interests). The University notified the applicant that it was also applying s. 21(1) to that information. Mediation by the OIPC failed to resolve the issues and the applicant requested that they proceed to inquiry. The applicant, the third party and the University all provided inquiry submissions.

ISSUES

[3] The issues to be decided in this inquiry are as follows:

1. Is the University authorized to refuse to disclose the information at issue under s. 17(1) of FIPPA?

2. Is the University required to refuse to disclose the information in dispute under ss. 21(1) or 22 of FIPPA?

[4] Under s. 57(1) of FIPPA, the burden of proof is on the University to establish that the applicant has no right of access to all or part of a record withheld under ss. 17(1) and 21(1). Section 57(2) places the burden of proof on the applicant to prove that disclosure would not be an unreasonable invasion of third party personal privacy under s. 22.

DISCUSSION

Information in dispute

[5] There are six pages of records in dispute. They each contain two columns of information: one for the name the individual or organization that made a donation and the other for the amount donated. Four pages have been fully withheld and contain the names of 133 individuals (Individual Donors) and the amounts they donated. [1] The four pages also contain banner-type information, such as the University's logo, headings and page numbers.

[6] Most of the other two pages have been disclosed. They contain the names of 80 organizations who donated more than $3,000 to the University. [2] The University has withheld 18 entries which reveal the names of two corporate donors, one foundation and 11 estates along with the amounts they donated.

[1] Some of the names appear more than once indicating that an individual has made more than one donation within the timeframe of the request.
[2] As with the Individual Donors, some of the organizations donated more than once.

The University says these donors have specifically requested that their identities and the amounts they donated be kept confidential (Organization Donors).[3]

Section 17 – Harm to financial interests

[7] The University says that s. 17(1) of FIPPA applies to all of the information in dispute. Section 17(1) authorizes public bodies to refuse to disclose information that "could reasonably be expected to harm the financial or economic interests of a public body or the government of British Columbia or the ability of that government to manage the economy." Examples of this type of harm are listed in ss. 17(1)(a) to (f). However, this list is not exhaustive and disclosing other types of information may still constitute harm under s. 17(1).[4]

[8] The standard of proof for exceptions that use the language "could reasonably be expected to harm" is set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner)*:

> This Court in *Merck Frosst* adopted the "reasonable expectation of probable harm" formulation and it should be used wherever the "could reasonably be expected to" language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in *Merck Frosst* emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence "well beyond" or "considerably above" a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground… This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and "inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences": *Merck Frosst*, at para. 94, citing *F.H. v. McDougall*, 2008 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41, at para. 40.[5]

[9] Although there is no need to establish certainty of harm, it is not sufficient to rely on speculation.[6] Further, in *British Columbia (Minister of Citizens' Services) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner)*, Bracken, J. confirmed that it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm, and that the burden rests with the

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[3] University's initial submission, para. 3; Second affidavit of University's Vice President, para. 10.
[4] Order F17-39, 2017 BCIPC 43 (CanLII) at para. 58; Order F16-38, 2016 BCIPC 42 (CanLII) at para. 100.
[5] *Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner)*, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII), at para. 54.
[6] Order F17-39, 2017 BCIPC 43 (CanLII) at para. 60; Order 00-10, 2000 CanLII 11042 (BC IPC) at p. 10.

public body to establish that the disclosure of the information in question could result in the identified harm.[7]

[10] I will apply the above approach to determine if the University has met its burden in applying s. 17(1) to the names of the Individual and Organization Donors and the amounts of their donations.

The University's position

[11] The University submits that disclosure of the names and amounts donated by the Individual Donors and the Organization Donors could reasonably be expected to cause harm to its economic interests by causing it to lose donations. It says that the Organization Donors have specifically requested that information about their donations not be shared publically and that these donors, as well as other future donors who do not want to be identified, will choose not to donate to the University in the future if the information in dispute is disclosed. Although the Individual Donors have not specifically requested that their donations remain confidential, the University submits that they too will refuse to make future donations if the information in dispute relating to them is disclosed.[8]

[12] In support of its position, the University refers me to Alberta Order F2010-036. In F2010-036, the applicant sought access to names of donors to the University of Calgary. The university withheld the names of the donors who asked not to be identified under s. 25 of the Alberta *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*. Section 25 of the Alberta is similar to s. 17(1) of FIPPA in that it permits a public body to refuse to disclose information to an applicant if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the economic interest of a public body.[9] At inquiry, the adjudicator concluded that the university was authorized to withhold the names of the donors who had asked not to be identified because disclosing the identities of the donors could have the effect of reducing the donations the university would receive in the future.[10]

[13] In making that finding, the adjudicator emphasized that if the public body was required to disclose the names of the donors who had asked that their donations remain confidential, it is unlikely that those donors, and other donors who would also prefer to donate anonymously, would make future donations to the public body. The adjudicator concluded that there was a direct connection between disclosing information that would serve to identify donors, and losing

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[7] *British Columbia (Minister of Citizens' Services) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner)*, 2012 BCSC 875 (CanLII), at para. 43.
[8] University's initial submission, paras. 5 and 14.
[9] Order F2010-036, 2011 CanLII 96613 (AB OIPC) at para. 26.
[10] *Ibid.*, at paras. 116-117.

donations and determined that the university was authorized to withhold the information in dispute under s. 25 of the Alberta *Act*.[11]

[14] The University submits that the reasoning in F2010-036 applies to the information in dispute in this inquiry.[12] It says that if the University cannot withhold the information in dispute and the donors' names are revealed, the University's future ability to fundraise and to offer programs to students will be significantly harmed.[13]

[15] Furthermore, the University says it has clear evidence that the disclosure of some of the information in dispute in this inquiry will result in financial harm. It says that one of the Organization Donors, the third party participating in this inquiry, has advised that if its identity is disclosed it will not follow through with future donations it has already committed to making to the University.[14] The University says that as such, it has provided "direct evidence of actual harm, in that one donor has already decided not to make future donations if anonymity cannot be preserved."[15] The University's Dean of the Faculty of Human and Social Development provided an affidavit in which she deposed that the third party informed the University it would not be making any future grants if its identity and the amounts it donated were made public.[16] The evidence the Dean provided *in camera* indicated that the amount the University is at risk of losing is significant.[17]

[16] The information about the third party in the Dean's affidavit is supported by an affidavit provided by the third party as part of its submissions in relation to s. 21(1). Legal counsel for the consulting company the third party engages to make donations to the University attested that she had been advised by the third party that it will not make further donations to the University until this inquiry is completed as it is concerned that "its identity, which it endeavours in all respects to protect" will be disclosed publicly.[18]

[17] The consulting company's legal counsel further deposed that the company also assists other clients who wish to make donations to the University in confidence but that the company has "ceased entertaining requests for grants from [the University] and will not do so until this matter is resolved" out of concern that the identity of the potential donors (its clients) will be revealed.[19]

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[11] Order F2010-036 (Re), 2011 CanLII 96613 (AB OIPC) at para. 118.
[12] University's initial submission, paras. 20-21.
[13] *Ibid.,* para. 20.
[14] *Ibid.*, para. 28-31.
[15] *Ibid* ., para. 20.
[16] Affidavit from the University's Dean of the Faculty of Human and Social Development, para. 3.
[17] *Ibid*., paras. 4, 8 and 12.
[18] Affidavit from legal counsel for third party's consulting company, para. 11.
[19] Affidavit from legal counsel for third party's consulting company, paras. 5 and 12.

The applicant's submissions

[18] The applicant says that the University has failed to establish that s. 17 applies to the information in dispute. He says the University has not demonstrated that there is a "clear and direct connection between disclosure of the information in dispute and the potential loss of donor funding."[20] He refers me to Order F07-15, which specified that the harm that is likely to be experienced by a public body under s. 17(1) "must flow directly from the release of the specific information being withheld" and that there "must be something in the information itself that is capable of causing the harm."[21]

[19] The Applicant says that the harm asserted by the University and the third party flows "solely from the parties' opposition to the disclosure of the information and is therefore not a harm within the meaning of s. 17."[22] He also cites Order F08-22 for the principal that the mere fact that a public body and a third party have agreed not to disclose certain information is not sufficient to establish harm under s. 17(1).[23]

[20] In my view, neither F07-15 nor F08-22 provide assistance in this inquiry. Both of those orders concerned information about contract negotiations and pricing details, which are significantly different types of information than what is currently at issue. Furthermore, in both of the orders the applicant references, former Commissioner Loukidelis noted that the public bodies did not provide sufficient evidence to support their assertions that a reasonable expectation of harm would result from the disclosure the information.[24] In contrast, the University has provided affidavit evidence that cogently describes the harm it alleges could reasonably be expected to result from disclosing the information in dispute about the third party and the other Organization Donors.[25]

[21] The applicant also submits that I should not be persuaded by the finding in Alberta decision F2010-036. He asserts that the adjudicator in that case erred by failing to consider that the public body could assure donor identities were kept confidential by not accepting donor information in the first place.[26] A large portion of the applicant's submissions are focussed on his argument that the University could assure donor information is kept confidential in the future by requiring that donors be anonymous vis-à-vis the University.[27] The applicant submits that individuals or organizations could donate truly anonymously by establishing an

[20] Applicant's submission, para. 12.
[21] *Ibid.*, para. 63, citing: Order F07-15, 2007 CanLII 35476 (BC IPC) at para. 17.
[22] Applicant's submission, para. 12.
[23] Order F08-22, 2008 CanLII 70316 (BC IPC) at para. 35.
[24] *Ibid.,* at paras. 20-21.
[25] See paras. 15-17 above.
[26] Applicant's submission, paras. 56-59.
[27] *Ibid.*, paras. 66-70.

agency or trust agreement with a third party, through which they could make donations.[28] In my view, whether or not the University could make arrangements to facilitate anonymous donations in the future is not relevant to the issue in this inquiry, which is whether the disclosure of the information in dispute would cause the type of harm referred to in s. 17(1) of FIPPA.

[22] The applicant also makes an extensive submission that the University's interpretation of s. 17 would undermine the purpose of FIPPA.[29] The applicant says that FIPPA must be "read in accordance with the purpose of the *Act*, which includes encouraging transparency (through access to information) and accountability of public bodies."[30] He says that where information is sought about universities that could undermine their function as democratic institutions the information must be made publicly accessible. He further asserts that "where university integrity is involved, the purpose of the *Act* should weigh heavily in the s. 17 analysis" and that "this analysis should include consideration of whether the university has an alternative means by which it can achieve its goal of maintaining anonymity without compromising transparency and accountability."[31]

[23] In essence, the applicant is asserting that in addition to determining whether the disclosure of information in dispute could reasonably be expected to harm the University, I must also consider s. 2 of FIPPA and weigh the purposes of the *Act* against the harm that the University would suffer if the information were disclosed. However, this type of two-step approach is not supported by past orders. As outlined by Adjudicator Alexander in Order F15-39, FIPPA provides a right of access to records, subject to specified limited exceptions. Section 17 is one of those exceptions to disclosure. If a public body establishes that s. 17 applies, further analysis regarding the purpose of the *Act* is not required.[32]

Section 17(1) – Conclusions

[24] Based on the submission and affidavit evidence provided by the University and outlined above, I accept that if the name of the third party and the amount it donated are disclosed, the third party will not continue to make donations to the University. The evidence provided by the University and the third party indicates

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[28] *Ibid.*, para. 50.
[29] Applicant's submission, paras. 11, 24-58 and 68-70.
[30] Applicant's submission, para. 68.
[31] Ibid., 68-69.
[32] I note that FIPPA has a mechanism by which applicants (under certain circumstances) may access information that is otherwise subject to a Part 2 exception if disclosure is clearly in the public interest. As emphasized by Adjudicator Alexander in Order F15-39, 2015 BCIPC 42, at paras. 76-77 and footnote 38, if s. 25 of FIPPA were to apply to the information in dispute s. 25 would override s. 17. Furthermore, s. 17 authorizes but does not require public bodies to refuse access to information, so public bodies are required to exercise their discretion about whether to withhold information.

that the harm would be that future funding which was previously committed to by the third party will be withdrawn. In my view, this constitutes financial harm as set out in s. 17(1) of FIPPA.

[25] I am also satisfied that if the information in dispute about the other Organization Donors who requested that their identities and donation information remain confidential is disclosed, they (and other prospective donors who wish to keep their identity and donations confidential) may also decide not to donate to the University in the future. As emphasized by the adjudicator in Alberta decision F2010-036, if a university is not in a position to withhold the names of donors who have asked to remain anonymous, it is conceivable that such donors will elect to donate to other causes that are able to keep the donation confidential.[33]

[26] As such, I find that there is a reasonable expectation of probable harm within the meaning of s. 17(1) of FIPPA. Therefore, s. 17(1) applies to the information in dispute about the Organization Donors and the University may refuse to disclose it on that basis.

[27] There is no evidence before me that the University has exercised its discretion to withhold the information about the Organization Donors in bad faith or that it considered irrelevant or extraneous grounds (or failed to consider relevant grounds) when making its decision under s. 17. While the applicant has made a number of submissions suggesting that the University may be "beholden to private interests," no evidence has been offered that would allow me to draw that conclusion or make a finding that the University has exercised its discretion inappropriately.[34]

[28] With regard to the four fully withheld pages containing information about the Individual Donors, the University submits that these individuals did not specifically request that their donations be kept confidential.[35] As such, I am not convinced that there is a reasonable expectation that the release of their names and the amounts they donated would impact their willingness, or the willingness of others, to donate to the University in the future. I find that s. 17(1) does not apply to those four pages. The University has not applied s. 21(1) to this information but it has applied s. 22(1). Therefore, I will consider whether the University is required to withhold the Individual Donors' information under s. 22(1).

[29] I note that the University also applied s. 21(1) to the two partially withheld pages of information about the Organization Donors to which I have determined s. 17(1) applies. Given my findings on s. 17(1), I do not need to consider whether s. 21(1) also applies to this information.

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[33] Order F2010-036 (Re), 2011 CanLII 96613 (AB OIPC) at para. 118.
[34] Applicant's submission, para. 48 and generally paras. 24-52.
[35] University's initial submission, para. 42.

Disclosure harmful to personal privacy – Section 22

[30] The University says that s. 22 of FIPPA applies to the names and amounts donated by the Individual Donors (Remaining Information) and that, as such, it is required to refuse to disclose that information to the applicant. Section 22(1) states that a "public body must refuse to disclose personal information to an applicant if the disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy." Numerous orders have considered the application of s. 22, and I will apply those same principles here.[36]

Personal Information

[31] The first step in the s. 22 analysis is to determine if the information in dispute is personal information. Personal information is defined as "recorded information about an identifiable individual other than contact information." Contact information is defined as "information to enable an individual at a place of business to be contacted and includes the name, position name or title, business telephone number, business address, business email or business fax number of the individual."[37]

[32] The applicant and the University agree that the Remaining Information is "personal information" within the meaning of s. 22 of the FIPPA.[38] I have reviewed the Remaining Information and I agree that with only a few exceptions, most of it is third party personal information because it is about identifiable donors. The exceptions are banner-type information, including the logo, page numbers and the headings on the first page. That information is not about identifiable individuals, so it is not personal information and s. 22 does not apply to it.

Section 22(4)

[33] Section 22(4) lists circumstances where s. 22 does not apply because disclosure would not be an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy. Both parties submit that none of the circumstances within s. 22(4) apply to the information in dispute.[39] I have reviewed the information and confirm that it does not fall into any of the categories in s. 22(4).

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[36] See for example, Order 01-53, 2001 CanLII 21607 (BC IPC) at para. 22; Order F15-52, 2015 BCIPC 55 (CanLII) at para. 32.
[37] See Schedule 1 of FIPPA for these definitions.
[38] Applicant's submission, para. 100; University's initial submission, para. 54.
[39] Applicant's submission, para. 100; University's initial submission, para. 56.

Section 22(3)

[34] The next step is to determine whether any of the presumptions in s. 22(3) apply. Section 22(3) states disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy in certain enumerated circumstances. The University says that s. 22(3)(f) applies. That section states:

> (3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy if
>
> …
>
> (f) the personal information describes the third party's finances, income, assets, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditworthiness, …

[35] In support of its position, the University directs me to Ontario Order MO-2262 where s. 14(3)(f) of Ontario's *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* was considered. That section is almost identical to s. 22(3)(f) of FIPPA. In MO-2262 the adjudicator concluded that s. 14(3)(f) applied to a list of donors to a city project that clearly linked each individual with a specific amount donated. The adjudicator found this was the donors' personal information and described their financial activities within the meaning of s. 14(3)(f).[40]

[36] The University submits that a similar conclusion was reached in BC Order F17-39 where the adjudicator determined that the donors' names and the amount of their contributions to Capilano University constituted the donors' financial history and activities and was therefore afforded the protection under s. 22(3)(f) of FIPPA.[41]

[37] The applicant says that Orders MO-2262 and F17-39 are distinguishable from the current fact scenario because the applicants in those cases were seeking more information about the donors than merely the amounts donated.[42] The applicant says that in this case, he "seeks only the names of donors and the amounts donated (over $3,000), and is not seeking any tax receipt or benefit gained, or any additional information about the donations."[43] He says that this limited information "does not describe the financial activities of the donors, beyond the mere fact that a donation for a given amount was made."[44]

[38] In my view, the amount of information sought is irrelevant to the application of 22(3)(f). If the information in dispute is disclosed, it would reveal

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[40] Order MO-2262, 2008 CanLII 1825 (ON IPC) at p. 19.
[41] Order F17-39, 2017 BCIPC 43 (CanLII) at paras. 100-102.
[42] Applicant's submission, paras. 104 and 106.
[43] *Ibid.*, para. 105.
[44] *Ibid.*

the names of the Individual Donors who each donated at least $3,000.00 to the University, as well as the specific amount they donated. The information describes the Individual Donors' financial activities within the meaning of s. 22(3)(f) and therefore disclosure is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of third party privacy.

Section 22(2)

[39] The final step in the s. 22 analysis is to consider the impact of disclosure of the personal information in light of all relevant circumstances, including those listed in s. 22(2). It is at this step that the presumptions may be rebutted. The parties submit that the following sections of 22(2) apply:

> 22(2) In determining under subsection (1) or (3) whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy, the head of a public body must consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether
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> (a) the disclosure is desirable for the purpose of subjecting the activities of the government of British Columbia or a public body to public scrutiny, …
>
> (e) the third party will be exposed unfairly to financial or other harm,
>
> (f) the personal information has been supplied in confidence,…
>
> (h) the disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of any person referred to in the record requested by the applicant, …

[40] The applicant says that section 22(2)(a) applies to the remaining information in dispute. Section 22(2)(a) has been interpreted to mean that disclosure of third party personal information may not be an unreasonable invasion of privacy if it would assist in fostering public body accountability.[45] In order for s. 22(2)(a) to apply, the information in question should relate broadly to the activities of the public body and there should be a wider public interest in the disclosure of the information.[46]

[41] The applicant says that there is a strong public interest in subjecting the University's receipts of private donations to scrutiny.[47] He asserts that the role of private money in universities is a major public concern. In support of this submission, he has attached news articles and an investigation report as exhibits to an affidavit. The first news article is titled "*The uneasy ties between Canada's universities and wealthy business magnates.*"[48] It is from the Financial Post

[45] Order F17-39, 2017 BCIPC 43 (CanLII) at para. 108.
[46] Order F05-14, 2014 CanLII 11965 (BC IPC) at para. 30.
[47] Applicant's submission, para. 108.
[48] Affidavit of Legal Assistant, Exhibit D.

in 2012 and provides an overview of different viewpoints on the role of private money in Canadian universities, focusing on the province of Ontario. Another news article exhibited in the applicant's affidavit was published in the Globe and Mail in 2015 and focuses on research collaborations between universities and private and non-profit companies.[49]

[42] There is no specific reference to the University of Victoria in any of these exhibits to his affidavit. While these materials suggest that there has historically been some public interest in the broader question about the role of private money in Canadian universities generally, they do not indicate that there are any issues with donations received by the University of Victoria or that any inappropriate private influence has resulted from those donations.

[43] Furthermore, I note that the Applicant also directs my attention to the University's Fundraising and Gift Acceptance policy, which provides that the University "will not accept Gifts that are unlawful or result in an abridgement of its academic freedom, autonomy, or integrity, and reserves the right to decline a Gift for any reason in its sole discretion."[50] Given that this policy exists, and where the Applicant has not offered any evidence that the University has breached the policy, I do not accept the Applicant's submission that the University's integrity is at issue in this inquiry.

[44] I am not convinced that the disclosure of the Remaining Information would assist in fostering public body accountability. In my view, disclosure of the Remaining Information is more likely to subject the Individual Donors' activities to public scrutiny rather than the University.[51] I find that disclosure of the Individual Donor's personal information is not desirable for the purpose of subjecting the University's activities to public scrutiny.

[45] I have also considered whether there are any other enumerated or non-enumerated circumstances that would weigh in favour of disclosure and am satisfied that there are not. The University raised s. 22(2)(e), (f) and (h) but it is not necessary to consider them because those circumstances merely bolster my finding that disclosing the personal information would be an unreasonable invasion of the Individual Donor's privacy. I conclude that the applicant has not rebutted the presumption against disclosure under s. 22(3)(f).

Section 22(1) – Conclusion

[46] I find that the majority of the Remaining Information is the Individual Donors' personal information and that its disclosure would be an unreasonable

[49] *Ibid.*, Exhibit E.
[50] Applicant's submission, para. 43 and Gift Policy at Exhibit A of the second affidavit of the Vice President of the University.
[51] Order F14-41, 2014 BCIPC 44 (CanLII) at para. 55.

invasion of their personal privacy under s. 22(1). However, the banner-type information described in paragraph 31 above is not personal information so s. 22 does not apply to it.

CONCLUSION

[47] For reasons above, I make the following orders:

1. Under s. 58(2)(b) of FIPPA, I confirm that the University is authorized to refuse the applicant access to the names and donation amounts of the Organization Donors that are withheld under s. 17(1).

2. Under s. 58(2)(c), I require the University to refuse the applicant access to the names and donation amounts of the Individual Donors it withheld under s. 22(1).

3. The University is required to give the applicant access to the balance of the information in dispute on or before June 27, 2018. The University must concurrently copy the OIPC's Registrar of Inquiries on its cover letter to the applicant, together with a copy of the records.

May 15, 2018

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Meganne Cameron, Adjudicator

OIPC File No.: F16-68205